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Abstract 
This paper examines how innovative institutional arrangements are generated during 
processes of institutional bricolage. The aim of the paper is to highlight how an arrangement 
is selected among the others when many alternative exist or are imaginable. To address this 
question, we present a qualitative study of institutional bricolage in the context of the making 
of the European carbon market. We suggest that, during episodes of experimental bricolage, 
alternative arrangements may be tested and evaluated inside experimental spaces named 
platforms. We identify three selection mechanisms of innovative arrangements at play inside 
such platforms: tacit compromise, natural selection and negotiation.  








EXPERIMENTATION AND BRICOLAGE ON INSTITUTIONS: UNDERSTANDING THE 
SELECTION OF NEW ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Recently, neo-institutional theory has been developing an original view on innovation 
processes as bricolage (Boxenbaum and Rouleau, 2011; Garud and Karnøe, 2003; Højgaard 
Christiansen and Lounsbury, 2013). The emergence of innovative institutional arrangements 
may be understood as the result of on-going reshuffling of heterogeneous resources at hand 
within the institutional context (Leca and Naccache, 2006). These studies depict institutional 
innovation as an incremental process, rather than a radical one. Almost anything present in the 
institutional context may constitute a resource for institutional innovation: residues of old 
institutional order (Zietsma and Macknight, 2009), cultural elements such as symbols and 
logics (Højgaard Christiansen and Lounsbury, 2013), calculative tools and devices (Déjean et 
al., 2004), narratives and metaphores (Slager et al., 2012); shared culture and meanings 
(Hargadon and Douglas, 2001). The recombining process as known as reflexive dialogue is 
now quite well understood. Nevertheless, the mechanisms whereby an arrangement is selected 
during the reflexive dialogue are unknown. Some scholars suggest that the relevance of the 
arrangements generated during the reflexive dialogue is systematically assessed by a test 
(Baker and Nelson, 2005; Duymedjian and Rüling, 2010).   
Drawing on the research program on the performativity of economics, we explore the 
different modalities whereby innovative arrangements are tested (Callon, 1998; Guala, 2005; 
2007; MacKenzie and Millo, 2003; MacKenzie, 2003; 2006; 2007). Muniesa and Callon 
(2007) distinguish between three experimental configurations within which such tests are 
organized: laboratories, platforms and in vivo. We particularly focus on the role of platforms 
in organizing the testing of the output of institutional bricolage. A platform refers to an 
experimental configuration open to heterogeneous actors (not only scientists but also policy 
makers, experts from the industry and other stakeholders) that engage in institutional 
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bricolage and test the alternative outputs of such bricolage. In the context of institutional 
theory, our objective is to identify and describe the mechanisms at play in the selection of the 
output of bricolage inside platforms.  
To inform this question, we conducted a qualitative study of tow bricolage episodes 
undertaken in such a platform during the institutionalization of the European carbon market. 
The European carbon market is an institutional innovation which early origin may be traced to 
a current of economic theory developed in the 1960s by Coase (1960). The making of 
concrete carbon markets involved intense bricolage on the theory to transform it into viable, 
collectively accepted regulation. After the Kyoto Protocol, many platforms arose in Europe 
and hosted such bricolage (Callon, 2009; Wettestad, 2005). One of them - the GETS platform 
run by the electricity sector, played a crucial role in the making of the European carbon 
market. Analyzing the archives of the GETS platform, we examine how its members engaged 
in institutional bricolage to construct a functional carbon market and mobilize allies around 
their institutional project. We found three selection mechanisms of innovative institutional 
arrangements : tacit compromise, natural selection and negotiation.   
Our contribution is threefold. First, we contribute to the neo-institutional literature by 
identifying three selection mechanisms of institutional innovations: tacit compromise, natural 
selection and negotiation. We also highlight the role of platforms in processes of institutional 
innovation. Second, we contribute to the literature on the performativity of economics by 
describing empirically the three activities undertaken on platforms: crafting, testing and 
evaluating. Third, we contribute to the literature on organizational bricolage by showing that 
selection may occur anytime during the reflexive dialogue, whereas previous studies suggest 




Institutional Innovation as Bricolage 
An increasing number of neo-institutional studies describe innovation as the reshuffling of 
resources at hand within the institutional context into a new arrangement (Garud and Karnøe, 
2003; Leca and Naccache, 2006; Rao et al., 2005; Zietsma and Macknight, 2009). Innovation 
is depicted as an incremental process, rather than a radical one, that involves recombining 
almost anything, present in the institutional context: residues of old institutional order 
(Zietsma and Macknight, 2009), cultural elements such as symbols and logics (Højgaard 
Christiansen and Lounsbury, 2013), calculative tools and devices (Arjaliès, 2013; Déjean et 
al., 2004), narratives and metaphors (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Slager et al., 2012); 
shared culture and meanings (Hargadon and Douglas, 2001). These studies envision the 
institutional context as a toolkit, from which designers may pick up elements at will. They 
agree that new institutions arise through continuous reshuffling of old institutional elements. 
More recently, neo-institutional scholars have used the concept of bricolage to  qualify such 
recombining process (Boxenbaum and Rouleau, 2011; Cartel, 2013; Garud and Karnøe, 2003; 
Glynn, 2008; Højgaard Christiansen and Lounsbury, 2013). 
Introduced by Levi Strauss (1962; 1966), the concept of bricolage qualifies a quite singular 
way of acting that results in the production of novel arrangements. Since Levi-Strauss seminal 
writings (Ibid.), the notion of bricolage has increasingly been mobilized within organizational 
studies to characterize innovation situations and practices (see Duymedjian and Rüling, 2010 
for a detailed review of the concept of bricolage within the management and organizational 
studies). Here are the main characteristics of bricolage that have been borrowed to Levi-
Strauss and further developed. First, the nature of the resources used, often obsolete objects 
and residues is not associated with traditional robust innovation (Baker et al., 2003). Second, 
the resources are often diverted from their original use to acquire new meanings and identities 
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that they were never intended to when they were designed (Baker and Nelson, 2005; Ciborra, 
1996). Third, the design process is rather distributed, unpredictable, complex and unplanned 
(Ciborra, 2002; Garud and Karnøe, 2003). Eventually, it seems that the project of collective 
bricolage is more about fostering compromising between actors that are driven by 
heterogeneous, sometimes antagonistic, logics rather than generating robust or original 
solutions (Højgaard Christiansen and Lounsbury, 2013). The reshuffling process whereby 
novel arrangements are generated is referred to as reflexive dialogue.  
When it comes to institutions, the reflexive dialogue enables both the creation of novel 
institutional arrangements. However, the mechanisms whereby an institutional arrangement is 
selected during the reflexive dialogue is unknown. Indeed, the reshuffling of institutional 
elements potentially generates a vast panel of competing arrangements among which the 
bricoleur(s) must operate a selection. The literature on organizational bricolage suggests that 
arrangements are tested during the reflexive dialogue and that the bricoleur that follows an 
essay and error progression (Duymedjian and Rüling, 2010; Garud and Karnøe, 2003).   
This paper aims to enhance the understanding of institutional innovation processes by 
analyzing how emerging institutional arrangements are selected. In particular, we focus on 
how the testing of innovative arrangements is organized. 
Exploring the Role of Testing in Institutional Bricolage: the Inputs of the Research 
Program on the Performativity of Economics 
The research program on the performativity of economics considerably enriches the 
understanding of the conditions under which the testing of innovative arrangements is 
organized (Callon, 1998; Guala, 2005; 2007; MacKenzie and Millo, 2003; MacKenzie, 2003; 
2006; 2007). Focusing on the role of experimentation in processes of economic innovation, 
Muniesa and Callon (2007) identify three ideal typical "locations" in which collective testing 
is organized.  
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Three experimental configurations of tests. 
In order to qualify such “locations”, Muniesa and Callon (2007) distinguish between three 
ideal typical experimental configurations of experimentation: the laboratory, the platform and 
in vivo experiments. Such locations arise and play considerable role during “experimental 
episodes” of innovation processes. Their role is to catalyze mutual adjustment between an 
innovation (idea or concept) and the socio-technical conditions under which it becomes 
operational.  
The laboratory refers to confined spaces, which access is restricted to a limited number of 
actors, defined in advance. In general, the actors authorized inside the laboratory come from 
the same intellectual domain. The laboratory is characterized by the distinction it operates 
between the outside – the “real economy” – and the inside – the artificial representation of 
economy of the laboratory. In order to be studied, economic objects undergo a purification 
process: they must be simplified and stylized to fit the manipulation. The knowledge that is 
expected to be produced in such spaces can be labeled as “scientific knowledge”. Its 
demonstration and diffusion is ensured through conferences and scientific colloquiums.  
A second space of experimentation identified by Muniesa and Callon (2007) is termed 
platform. The platform refers to a space that, in comparison to the laboratory, is more open 
toward the “outside”. Participants - their role and nature - are likely to evolve over time, and 
join the experimentation. Such a configuration enables new forms of interactions, in 
particular, the hybridization and confrontation of different domains of knowledge, 
competences and interests. The platform configuration enables to test objects that are more 
complex and closer to “real economic objects” than the laboratory. Demonstration in 
platforms is more about achieving a compromise – shared understandings and expectations –
between the participants than creating scientific knowledge.  
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Eventually, economic experiments might also take place in vivo, so to say directly on the 
objects of “real economy”. Compared to the laboratory configuration, the distinction between 
the outside and the inside is definitively abolished. The list of participants is likely to evolve 
during the experimentation moment and the experimental objects are directly taken from the 
environment. As no effort is made to theorize and purify them, they keep the status of black 
box and what is observed is not how they are transformed but rather how they react to the 
process.   
The particular role of platforms in selecting the output of bricolage. 
Among these three ideal-typical configurations, one is particularly favorable to bricolage 
processes (Ciborra, 1996; 2002; Muniesa and Callon): the platform. Contrary to the laboratory 
and in vivo experiments that have already received considerable attention (Latour, 1987; 
Muniesa, 2003), platforms stem from an intuition of Muniesa and Callon (2007) and have 
never been observed empirically. As a consequence, the role they play in the making of our 
institutional patterns deserves more attention. In order to analyze selection mechanisms 
during processes of institutional bricolage, the paper explores the role of platforms. 
 
METHOD AND DATA 
Field Settings 
The European carbon market: a product of bricolage. 
The European carbon market is the first and largest carbon market in the world. It was 
enacted in 2003 as a result of a two years consultation process among the different 
stakeholders including the industry, NGO's, the electricity sector, the different European 
governments and the European Commission (Braun, 2009; Callon, 2009; Christiansen and 
Wettestad, 2003; Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2008; Wettestad, 2005). The Eu-ETS is now 
providing the basic framework for the construction of new carbon markets all over the world. 
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Carbon markets in general and the Eu-ETS in particular, are singular devices imagined and 
designed to organize the collective mitigation effort on climate change. They materialized into 
hybrid forms, at the frontier between economic devices, environmental policy devices and 
managerial devices. First, a carbon market is an economic device as it relies on strong 
economic theory developed in the 1960 in the United States by a series of reputed economists: 
Coase (1960), Crocker (1966), Dales (1968) and Montgomery (1972). It is also widely 
considered as a public policy device. Cap and Trade markets are classified under the category 
of command and control devices. They are implemented by public authorities when facing 
problems in managing common goods (Hardin, 1968). Thirdly, they are managerial devices as 
they are supposed to guide emission reductions and stimulate technology innovation at the 
company level. The carbon price that is delivered by such markets is supposed to inform 
managerial decisions.  
Carbon markets - as known as cap and trade - are characterized by the conjunction of three 
different institutional logics, environmental, economic and managerial (see Figure I). The cap 
or limit refers to the environmental constraint set by the public authority; Trade refers to the 
type of activities and behaviors that are undertaken on the device. Eventually a managerial 
logic is associated to carbon markets as they progressively became considered as decision 
making tools for companies. This heterogeneity is identifiable when reading the European 
carbon market directive that is literally invaded by managerial language (projects-based 
mechanisms; credits; monitoring and reporting system; energy-efficient technologies), 
economic locutions (cost effective functioning; banking) and environmental jargon (e.g. 
greenhouse gas concentrations; IPCC targets). 
--------------------------------------------------------- 




The different platforms in competition during the institutionalization process. 
After the Kyoto Protocol, alongside the effort of the European Commission to design a 
viable carbon market, intense collective inquiry was organized by different European actors 
including companies, governments, economists and NGO's that engaged in series of 
experiments on carbon markets inside platforms (Braun, 2009; Callon, 2009). Among these 
experiments, the most famous are the carbon market prototype experimented by the energy 
company British Petroleum at the company level, the Climate Change Levy imagined by the 
United Kingdom and the simulation organized by the economists of the International Energy 
Agency in the Balkan region (Christiansen and Wettestad, 2003; Ellerman and Butchner, 
2007; Zapfel and Vaino, 2002). During this "experimental moment" in the wild, many 
alternative designs of carbon markets were generated, discussed, confronted and negotiated 
inside platforms (Callon, 2009; Wettestad, 2005). Tensions arose and fierce technical debates 
emerged as regard the desirable design of carbon markets (Hepburn et al., 2006; Neuhoff et 
al., 2006).  
In 2001, the European Commission organized a consultation meeting between the different 
platforms for them to discuss and negotiate the details of the design of the forthcoming carbon 
market. The compromise that was found constituted the technical basis of the directive 
establishing an emission trading scheme in Europe. The design that was eventually 
institutionalized is exactly similar to the one developed by the electricity sector inside the 
GETS platform - Greenhouse gas and Electricity Trading Simulation. The European carbon 
market was eventually launched in 2005 by the European Commission as an experimentation. 
If it was not for a few experts, and two academic articles (Braun, 2009; Skjaerseth and 
Wettestad, 2013) vaguely citing the experiment, the GETS platform would have been 
completely forgotten.  
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The GETS platform. 
The GETS platform may be described as the conjunction of three dimensions: (1) a net of 
actors - the bricoleurs (2) gathered around an experimental device - a carbon market 
prototype (3) undertaking bricolage on the prototype (see Figure 2).  
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
The GETS platform hosted two bricolage episodes that played a great role in the 
institutionalization of the Eu-ETS as they hosted the main stakeholders of the process. The 
first bricolage episode involved only the European electricity companies whereas the second 
one extended the net of participants to the European industry, financial institutions and the 
European Commission. The participants to the platform engaged in collective bricolage on a 
prototype of carbon market and eventually reached a compromise toward the most desirable 
design.  
The paper explores in detail the role of the GETS platform in the making of the European 
carbon market. We reconstruct the two bricolage episodes undertaken inside the platform and 
highlight the micro-mechanisms inside the platform that led to selection of the so-called 
GETS2.1 design, that was eventually institutionalized in 2003.   
Data Collection 
We conducted an in-depth longitudinal case study analysis covering a 5-year period from the 
“preparatory phase” of Kyoto in 1997 to the EU-ETS implementation in 2003  (Pettigrew, 
1990). The data were collected over two and a half years of in-depth investigation, from 
December 2009 to June 2012.  We collected two bodies of data.   
Archival research.  
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First, we collected archives of both the GETS simulation (e.g. internal documents such as 
personal mail archives, companies’ internal reports and external documents such as 
Eurelectric’s official position papers, GETS simulation reports) and the European Emission 
Trading Scheme directive (e.g. draft projects, green papers, white papers, the written accounts 
of the European Commission’s stakeholder meetings). These documents provided us with 
valuable information on (1) the bricolage activities undertaken in the GETS platform for the 
duration of the GETS experiments; (2) The co-evolution of the GETS experiment and its 
institutional context.  
Interviews.  
We supplemented the archival research with interviews with both the actors of the GETS 
and the main stakeholders of the making of the Eu-ETS. We were interested in the role they 
played during the institutional process, either as bricoleurs inside the GETS platform, or as 
bricoleurs outside the GETS platform. What were their strategic positions towards carbon 
markets and how did these positions evolve throughout the GETS experiments? What types of 
strategic alliances were created in the GETS platform? We held 18 semi-structured  
interviews with these actors. We distinguish between three types of actors playing different 
roles in the GETS experiment: (1) the organisers of the experiment (The members of 
Eurelectric's working group on climate change and an expert from the international energy 
agency); (2) participants to the role play (representative of the electricity companies that 
participated, the representatives of industrial companies and financial institutions that 
participated); and (3) external contributors (A member of the group on an emission trading 
scheme at the European Commission and other economists and experts in view at this 
moment).  
Among the organisers of the role play, we interviewed two members of Eurelectric: (1) 
John Scowcroft, Head of Eurelectric’s working group on climate change, who, since he had 
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been in charge of the dossier on the liberalisation of the electricity sector at UNIPEDE, had 
become “a devoted supporter of market instruments” (Scowcroft, 2012); and (2) Jean-Yves 
Caneill, a member of the working group who had acquired special skills in modelling during 
his PhD. From the International Energy Agency, we interviewed Richard Baron, a young 
economist specialised in emission trading, who was in charge of supervising the GETS 
simulation. From ParisBourse stock market, we interviewed Thierry Carol, a young trader 
interested in the developments surrounding environmental markets. Our questions were 
oriented into mainly five directions: their role in the platform, what they learnt during the 
GETS episode (about the design of carbon markets, and the effects they could have); what 
were the different possible alternatives for the carbon market design and what were their 
selection criteria; what were the positions of the platform members toward carbon markets 
before and after the GETS episodes; how was the platform perceived externally.  
Among the participants to the role play, we interviewed representatives of each sector 
involved – electricity, industry, financial –, in order to compare their strategic positions and 
expectations with regard to carbon markets and the evolution of these positions over the 
course of the experiments. We interviewed Jean-Yves Caneill again in his capacity as head of 
climate policy at Electricité de France
1
. From the industry, we met Chris Boyd, who was in 
charge of sustainability issues at Lafarge
2
 and was in favour of market-based instruments, as 
well as two members of the paper industry. From the financial sector, we interviewed Dirk 
Forister from NatSource, an asset management services provider for environmental markets. 
He was in charge of defending the financial sector’s participation in the EU-ETS as the 
sector’s participation in a European carbon market was controversial. We weren’t able to 
interview Peter Vis from the European Commission that contributed to the GETS experiment 
as an external advisor. We asked them if they had made propositions to the design of the 







carbon market prototype, what they learnt during the role play, and what were the crucial 
elements that made them prefer one specific design better than another. 
As regards the main stakeholders who were not directly involved in the experiments, we 
interviewed Peter Zapfel, a member of the team in charge of the Dossier at the European 
Commission, to understand the nature of the relations between the EC and the electricity 
sector. We also interviewed two carbon economists and one member of the French industrial 
think tank on sustainable development “Entreprises Pour l’Environnement” (EPE), who 
enriched our understanding of the events that led from Kyoto to the enactment of the EU-
ETS. These actors are well known for the role they played during the institutionalization 
phase  of the Eu-ETS and we wanted their opinion on the role that GETS played during the 
process. 
Data Analysis 
We analyzed the data in four steps. First, we familiarized ourselves with the GETS 
experiment by reading the archival materials as well as the paper positions addressed to the 
European Commission during the period considered (1999-2001). This first contact with the 
data gave us insights into the controversial issues that were debated, allowed us to identify 
key events and provided background knowledge about both the experiment and its 
institutional context. 
Secondly, we build a narrative account of the GETS experimentation together with the 
evolution of the institutional context in which it occurred (Langley, 1999). Drawing on both 
the experimentation archives and the archives of the legal texts enacting carbon markets at the 
European Commission. Our chronology was validated by an expert that participated to the 
GETS platform, Mr Jean-Yves Caneill (see Figure 3). 
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Thirdly, we traced instances referring to the organizational activities undertaken in the 
platforms during each of the two GETS episodes. We identified two successive episodes of 
crafting, testing and evaluating of the carbon market prototype inside the GETS platform.  
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Eventually, we conducted a second round of coding to identify the selection mechanisms at 
play during the three activities undertaken on the platform.  
 
FINDINGS 
Bricolage Inside the GETS Platform: Crafting, Testing and Evaluating a Carbon 
Market Prototype 
Bricolage in the GETS platform episode 1: Prototyping. 
Following his intuition that carbon markets could become a reality soon in Europe, John 
Scowcroft, head of climate policy at Eurelectric decided to prepare the electricity sector. In 
December 1988, Eurelectric working group on climate change, together with ParisBourse and 
the IEA engaged in a first episode of bricolage on carbon markets on the GETS platform. The 
bricoleurs first crafted a prototype of carbon market. At the beginning of 1999, Eurelectric's 
working group on climate change organised a role play to test the prototype, involving the 
main European electricity companies. The results of the test were further discussed and 
evaluated. we present these three activities in detail here 
Crafting 1. The output of the crafting is a carbon market prototype, so to say, a set of rules 
that frames carbon trading (cf. Figure 4).  
--------------------------------------------------------- 





The members of Eurelectric working group on climate change collectively defined the 
rules of the prototype. To define the rules, the working group drew on divers sources. The 
first one is the architecture of the sulphur market that had taken place previously in the United 
States that gave a general idea of what a carbon market should look like. Another important 
source was the economic theory that had been developed in the sixties in the US. To gain 
expertise with these domains of knowledge, Eurelectric's working group on climate change 
invited economists experts in cap and trade theory to familiarise with the basics of economic 
theory. They also organized a trip to the United states to visit utilities that had been 
constrained by the sulphur market. Following this learning episode, the working group 
discussed the different options for the rules. 
One simple example of rule is the rule that defines the nature of carbon credits. The 
working group decided that a carbon credit would be equal to a tone of carbon. Technical 
decisions were made on the nature of the market: should it be a baseline and credit such as its 
cousin in the United States, or rather a cap and trade as economic theory recommended, or 
even maybe a project market that were proposed in the Kyoto Protocol? Sensitive decisions 
were to be made on more touchy topics such as the "allocation rule". The allocation rule 
defines the protocol whereby carbon credits are allocated to the companies. Theoretically, 
many options were imaginable such as auctioning or negotiating. The working group chose 
the grandfathering option that consists in allocating credits to a company according to its past 
emissions. The advantage of this option for the electricity sector is that credits are attributed 
for free (which is not the case with auctions for instance). Due to the reluctance of the 
electricity sector toward any carbon constraint at this moment, the working group chose the 
grandfathering option even if they would have preferred an auctioning method for theoretical 
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reasons. The working group then invited the International Energy Agency, which had 
expertise on cap and trade markets theory, to refine the rules.  
Testing 1. In order to test the carbon market prototype, Eurelectric, in collaboration with 
the International Energy Agency and ParisBourse (the French stock exchange), organized a 
role play between companies from the electricity sector. The objectives of the test were (1) to 
assess the effects of a carbon constraint on power generation (2) to learn how carbon trading 
could be integrated in companies' activity; (3) to draw practical lessons for the design of 
carbon markets. 
The role play consisted in setting a carbon constraint to the companies. To comply 
with their constraint, electricity companies would engage in carbon trading on the market 
prototype. To perform the exchanges of carbon assets, ParisBourse lent its trading platform 
during closing hours. Nineteen European power companies volunteered to participate to the 
role play. The role play was organized in a way that distances the test from real conditions. 
First, the players were masked: the electricity companies participate under a fake identity. 
Before the beginning of the game, each company was asked to create a virtual profile: it had 
to select an energy mix and installed capacity. For instance, virtual company 1 chose 5% wind 
power, 26% coal and 69% cogeneration for its energy mix. Only the organizers (Eurelectric, 
ParisBourse and the IEA) knew what real company corresponded to what virtual profile. A 
total of sixteen virtual companies were created. Second, unrealistic assumptions were made 
by the organizers for instance on emission constraints and fuel prices. Each of the virtual 
companies had to comply with both national electricity demand and a carbon emission target 
(8% over emissions for the year 2000). To the contrary, some elements were explicitly 
intended to mimic real conditions as closely as possible. For example, to reach their targets, 
the organizers provided virtual companies with three options : not only they could trade 
carbon (buying carbon trading if the carbon target is exceeded). They could also trade 
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electricity (buy cleaner electricity for instance and reduce their own production) with other 
virtual companies, or invest in clean technologies (to reduce carbon footprint).  
"In order to obtain a simulation that would generate realistic results, some real 
world constraints were imposed on the activity of the virtual companies" 
(GETS1 report p6). 
The role play lasted eight weeks. Each Wednesday, the representatives of each virtual 
company, wherever the real company was physically located, would log to a collective trading 
session during two hours. Each session represented either one or two years of activity. The 
session provided them with the data they needed to build their carbon strategies. Of course, 
the companies were virtual so the strategies deployed and tested by each member were not 
associated with a real company. At the end of the 8 weeks of the role play, all companies but 
two complied with their objective. The working hypothesis made by Eurelectric’s workgroup 
is that some reluctant companies tried to sabotage the results and didn't comply on purpose.  
Evaluating. The evaluation of the prototype consisted in (1) deciding whether carbon 
markets were desirable or not in a carbon constrained world, and (2) discussing the relevance 
of the different design features of the prototype. It was undertaken by the participants to the 
role play (so to say members of the European electricity companies that participated to the 
role play), the members of Eurelectric's working group on climate change, and the 
International Energy Agency. Surprisingly, most of the electricity companies that had 
participated to the role play agreed on the desirability of a carbon markets, which seemed 
difficult before the role play. Only the German companies that did not believe that the 
Commission would constrain them were still ready to defend their position against a carbon 
market project. Indeed, companies in France and in the UK were in favour of carbon markets 
whereas German companies were quite reluctant. Italian and Spanish companies also were 
reserved on their positions. Both Jean-Yves Caneill and John Scowcroft emphasised the role 
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that GETS 1 played in readjusting positions within the electricity sector. As we already 
mentioned,  
“Culturally, they were not ready for market-based instruments.” (Jean-Yves Caneill, 
Participant to the role play, May 2011) 
The evaluation criteria mobilized by the platform members fall into two dominant logics.  
A managerial logic: the role play highlighted that a carbon constraint and a carbon market 
were two independent items. After the role play, companies did not envision carbon trading as 
a constraint any more but as a tool for compliance.  
"The simulation clearly showed that trading could help participants to best manage 
their CO2 emission objective together with their core activity." (GETS1, 1999: 25) 
Thanks to the flexibility of the experimental carbon market that enabled to arbitrate 
choices between different managerial strategies (trading carbon, trading electricity, investing 
in new capacity), companies that relied on trading easily achieved their objectives. 
"Trading provided the opportunity to manage their (the virtual companies) extra CO2 
permits as an asset, either to be used as banking from one period to the next, or to 
generate revenues, in order to minimise their cost of meeting the CO2 emission 
objective." (GETS1, 1999: 25) 
An economic logic: the testing of the experimental carbon market made it clear that, from an 
economic point of view, a carbon market was much more desirable than a carbon tax.  
“The main learning point derived from GETS 1 was that a carbon market could help 
reduce compliance costs. This point convinced most of the companies that were 
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reluctant before the experiment.” (John Scowcroft, Head of sustainable development at 
Eurelectric, October 2010).  
Except for the German companies that left the platform, the electricity sector collectively 
agreed that carbon markets should be institutionalized as a regulation tool at the European 
level. Their objective was now to refine their position on the design of carbon markets (revise 
the prototype rules) and mobilise allies toward the project. 
Bricolage in the GETS platform episode 2: Mobilizing allies. 
Eurelectric's working group learnt that the Commission was working on a Green Paper on 
greenhouse gas emissions trading, which was likely to be the first step toward the 
implementation of a carbon market in Europe. The results of GETS 1 were used to draft a 
Position Paper on the Commission’s Green Paper, in favour of carbon markets. Peter Vis, one 
of the civil servant of the Commission strongly engaged in the writing of the Green Paper, 
was keen to promote the constructive attitude of the power sector as it could become a key 
ally to implement the scheme. Indeed, the European industry seemed hostile to any form of 
carbon regulation, and the Commission needed allies to institutionalize carbon markets as the 
corner stone of its mitigation policy. Given the recent failure of the carbon tax, Jos Delbeke, 
head of the team in charge of climate policy, really needed this measure to be accepted. 
For both the electricity sector and the European Commission, it was now of major 
importance to convince the rest of the industry of the advantages of a carbon market. This 
would not be an easy task as the industry mostly perceived the GETS experiment as a threat, 
and carbon markets as a constraint. Indeed, as John Scowcroft told us, they saw the 
experiment as a way for the electricity sector to secure strong positions that only they would 
benefit from. Peter Zapfel, a member of Jos Delbeke’s team, confided us that the dialogue 
with the industrial actors sometimes revealed to be very tough.  
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In order to ensure the participation of the rest of the industry, Eurelectric decided to 
organize a second simulation with the industrial actors mentioned in the Commission’s green 
paper.  
“We were afraid that the rest of the industry would kill the process so we decided to 
involve them in another simulation. Had we not involved the rest of the industry, we 
might not have done GETS 2.” (John Scowcroft, Head of the working group on climate 
change at Eurelectric, May 2012) 
Crafting 2. Six industrial sectors
3
 - Iron and Steel; Refining; Chemicals; Glass; building 
materials and Paper – and the financial sector were invited to join the platform. 
Eurelectric'sworking group on climate change also invited Peter Vis from the European 
Commission to put in dialogue the design of the GETS and the project of the Commission. 
“We invited Peter Vis to join the steering committee. He didn’t show up for every 
session but he did provide considerable input. His cooperation helped us to ensure 
consistency between the European Commission’s view and the industrial view” (John 
Scowcroft, Head of the working group on climate change at Eurelectric, May 2012).  
In order to ensure constructive collaboration from the new comers that were mainly hostile 
to the idea of carbon markets, each guest was welcome to make some inputs to the 
experimental market device. Participants were asked to make a written proposition to a 
Steering Committee, composed of the members of the working group and a consultant that 
had been retained to supervise the exercise. The steering Committee would analyze every 
proposition and decide whether it would be included to the design of the carbon market or not. 
In practice, the steering Committee only rejected propositions that were technically too 





complex to be tested in the context of the platform. For example, the idea of coupling the 
carbon market to a green bond system on energy was too complex to be organized. 
Most of the participants did make propositions to amend the rules and the technical 
features of the prototype that had been crafted during the first bricolage episode. One member 
asked to include "Kyoto Project Mechanisms" into the market rules. Kyoto project 
mechanisms are a type of market that is not cap and trade. It consists for a company (1) in 
reducing emissions in another company (2) through a project (technology transfer for 
instance). In exchange, company 1 gets as many credits as the project reduces emissions in 
company 2.  
Of course, all the propositions were not compatible. For instance, three allocation methods 
(the modality whereby carbon credits are distributed to the companies) were proposed, 
auctioning, benchmarking and grandfathering, respectively sponsored by the European 
Commission, the cement sector, the rest of the industry. At the end of the day, three 
alternative designs (each of them included a different allocation method) were generated, 
ready to be tested. These designs where very similar, except for the allocation method (see 
figure 5). 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Testing 2. The test of the three alternative markets that were crafted took the same form as 
in the first episode: a role play. Again, each participant had to create and register a virtual 
profile. Contrary to the first simulation, trading could be performed on both spot and future 
market. Furthermore, the models forecasting evolutions in prices and energy demand had 
been refined by PricewaterhouseCoopers since the last game.  
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Three simulations were organized successively in order to test the three alternative 
products of the crafting.  
The simulations "took place over a six month period: the first simulation 
occurred in February-March, the second in April-May and the third one in 
June. Each simulation was spread over 4 or 5 sessions taking place each 
Wednesday afternoon. Each of these sessions included 2 to 5 years of 
simulations, with each year simulated over one hour." (GETS 2 report p25)    
The simulations were organized as follows: a pre-opening session between 12:30 and 
13:00 was dedicated to the preparation of the session: the participants had to connect to the 
session. The trading platform is closed during the pre-opening. The session opens at 13:00 but 
the market remains closed until 13:20. During this time lap, participants define their strategy 
according to the information provided on the GETS website (e.g. energy prices, carbon prices 
of previous sessions, reporting information from previous sessions). At 13:20, market opens 
and participants trade. The market closes again from 14:00 to 14:20 and re-opens for another 
compliance period until 15:00 and so on. At the end of each simulation session, the 
participants had to carry out electronic reporting (GHG emissions, and production) on the web 
site created by the consulting agency. 
The concrete implementation of each proposition with the existing prototype as well as 
their feasibility was organized by the consulting agency. For instance, to enable the co-
existence of relative targets (asked by the cement sector) and absolute targets (asked by the 
others sectors), PricewaterhouseCoopers had to create a sophisticated "gateway" system. 
During the simulation the gateway system "bugged". 
"Price had to cheat on the allocations to make it work." (John Scowcroft, Head 
of the working group on climate change at Eurelectric, May, 2012) 
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Evaluating 2. At the level of the industry, the second simulation had a similar learning 
impact as GETS1 had at the scale of the electricity sector. 
“The role play provided the learning that was necessary to convince the 
industry as it helped defuse the negative connotations associated with it.” (Jean-
Yves Caneill, Participant to the simulation as a member of Eurelectric, 
December 2009).  
For some of the few participants that were already engaged on the climate issue such as Chris 
Boyd
4
 in the cement sector, the role play did not change their vision. Nevertheless, he told us 
that the experiment triggered an intellectual switch in his company as he invited other 
members of Lafarge to participate to the role play. He believes that GETS had a real impact 
on the diffusion of the idea of a carbon market to the board of directors.  
“The experiment did convince my colleagues at Lafarge that were not familiar with the 
matter, in particular in the financial division” (Chris Boyd, previously in charge of 
sustainable development at Lafarge, November 2011).  
At the end of the second experiment, the members of the industry that were presented by the 
Commission to take part to the carbon market were intellectually ready for market based 
instruments. Of course, they were not in favour of carbon regulation but as it was inevitable, 
they had acknowledged the relevance of carbon markets to provide flexibility to the 
constraint.   






Three different criteria were at play in the evaluation of the second experiment. In line with 
the first experiment, economic as well as managerial criteria were present in the acceptance of 
carbon market. 
A managerial logic: companies were convinced by the fact that a carbon market rapidly 
expresses the price of carbon that they should rely on to arbitrate between different strategies.  
An economic logic: the reason why grandfathering was preferred to auctioning by 
companies as regard the allocation method is that grandfathering provides an economic 
income as credits are attributed for free. Also, the participation of financial actors to the role 
play enhanced the fluidity and depth of the market which were criteria that played an 
important role according to  the final report.  
An environmental logic: For decision makers, the key aspect of the role play is that it 
helped defuse negative opinion of the industry toward carbon markets. Even if the European 
Commission and its economists were in favour of auctioning for reasons of market efficiency, 
they were keen to promote a device that they knew would be accepted by a great majority of 
actors.  Selection of the product of bricolage: the mechanisms at play 
The Selection Mechanisms at Play  
Now that we have presented the two episodes of bricolage in the GETS platform, we will 
focus in more details to the selection mechanisms at play. At each step of the bricolage 
(crafting, testing, evaluating), choices where made as regard the design of the carbon market. 
We particularly identified three selection mechanisms: tacit compromise, natural selection and 
negotiation. 
Tacit compromise. 
An example of tacit compromise is the form of selection at play during the first crafting 
episode as regard the allocation method. The bricoleurs (the working group on climate change 
and the international energy agency) have a preference for an auctioning method. This 
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preference is informed by economic theory, that states that when quotas are auctioned, the 
price of carbon is revealed more rapidly by the market. The fact that the market reveals the 
right price of carbon is an important issue the bricoleurs. From a managerial perspective, the 
price of carbon is a signal that enables electricity companies to arbitrate between different 
strategies (trading carbon, trading electricity or investing in clean technologies). From an 
economic perspective, auctioning enhances the global efficiency of the market. Nevertheless, 
the bricoleurs tacitly agreed to select a grandfathering method that they think will be more 
consensual between the electricity sector. Indeed, the bricoleurs are convinced that the 
European electricity sector, that is already quite reluctant as regard the idea of carbon 
markets, would more easily accept the exercise if allowances are distributed for free.  
Natural selection. 
Natural selection refers to the instantaneous formation of preferences toward an element of 
design. It can be either a positive or negative selection. A simple example of negative natural 
selection occurs during the second testing episode. As the gateway designed by the consulting 
agency bugs, the second alternative design that consists in allocating both absolute and 
relative targets must be abandoned. During this episode, the players all chose absolute targets 
as it was easier to manipulate, even the ones that had proposed the idea of relative targets.  
Natural selection may also be positive. During the first experiment, some elements of 
design that did not seem so important during the crafting revealed to be of crucial importance. 
For instance, the possibility to bank allowances from a period to the other revealed crucial in 
the formation of long term managerial strategies by the players. For the economists of the 
IEA, it also appears that the possibility of banking emissions stabilizes the price of carbon at 
the end of each engagement period (the price falls to zero at the end of each period when 
banking is not allowed).  
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"Virtual companies relied a lot on the possibility to bank emission permits generated in 
the first budget period, or to sell for revenues, when market prices were favorable." 
GETS 1 report p25)  
Negotiation. 
During the first evaluation phase, the players easily reached a compromise on the 
desirability of a carbon market as a regulatory instrument. The compromise was reached as 
the logics driving the preferences of the bricoleurs were fulfilled. From the point of view of 
the electricity companies, the test had enabled to revise their understanding of carbon markets 
and value propositions associated to this type of instrument. Carbon markets seemed to be 
efficient tools to manage a carbon constraint. From the point of view of the organizers of the 
game, the important feature was the demonstration that a carbon market was more interesting 
economically than a tax.  
During the second evaluation phase, a compromise was reached on the first alternative 
design, the so-called GETS 2.1. This design was preferred by the electricity companies and 
industrial companies because the allocations were distributed for free, compared to the third 
alternative (GETS 2.3) where allocations are auctioned. From the point of view of the 
European Commission, the third option was more desirable as auctioning would have ensured 
economic efficiency. Nevertheless, the important issue was that a regulation on carbon would 
be accepted, and its environmental integrity respected. The first alternative that was preferred 





On Institutional Theory  
Three selection mechanisms of institutional bricolage. 
When several alternative arrangements unfold during processes of institutional bricolage, 
the mechanisms whereby one of them is selected are quite unknown. Our findings highlight 
three selection mechanisms: tacit compromise, natural selection and negotiation. Tacit 
compromise involves no specific reasoning nor strategy from the bricoleurs. It happens when 
the bricoleurs implicitly share the same preferences and intimate understanding of their 
repertoire. Tacit compromise is not really conscious, neither guided by any strategic aim. 
Natural selection occurs as the bricoleurs begin to have more information on the situation. 
Either the bricoleurs realize that an arrangement is not technically feasible when they craft it, 
either they realize that the arrangement is not viable when they test it. Eventually, negotiation 
involves an important degree of learning from the bricoleurs as they must construct and 
express a judgment on an arrangement. Negotiation becomes possible after learning from the 
test and structuring preferences. The test reveals the players their value propositions and 
preferences. Indeed, value propositions and preferences don't preexist the test. Innovative 
arrangements are by nature unknown objects and the associated values must be learnt.   
Each selection mechanism relates to a certain degree of reflexivity and agency. Tacit 
compromise involves no reflexivity from the bricoleurs. They select an element by default 
and might not even be conscious that other alternatives where possible. Natural selection 
involves instantaneous learning. It is based on conscious choices by the bricoleurs, informed 
by a binary test "it works" or "it doesn't work" (learning may occur equally during the three 
bricolage activities). Eventually, negotiation requires a higher degree of reflexivity and 
agency. Negotiation becomes possible when the bricoleurs have learnt enough to form their 
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preferences as regard a design. Preferences toward the innovation may evolve during all the 
bricolage process as value propositions are revealed.   
The role of experimental platforms in processes of institutional bricolage 
Experimental platforms play an important role during processes of institutional bricolage 
in the way that they enable learning. Indeed, the nature of the experimental setting is 
explicitly meant to provoke reality and to be the closest as possible to real conditions. 
Different artifacts are created in order to mimic reality such as the random introduction of 
"accidents" in primary energy prices and realistic models of energy demand. Equivalences 
were created to ensure consistency between the conditions of the simulation and reality. Such 
effort of organizing the experimental conditions enable to learn things that still have value of 
truth outside the experimental configuration. To the contrary, an important effort is made to 
operate a distance between the experimental setting of the platform and real conditions. In the 
GETS, players are "masked". The mask provokes an epistemological switch in their collective 
dialogue. They are not defending the position of their organization; they are participating to a 
collective enquiry. Thus, the mask enables a temporary switch in the player's strategies: from 
individual strategies to a collective strategy. In the space of the platform, the players are 
facing the same uncertainties about both the nature of the object that is being designed - the 
output of bricolage -, its potential effects as well as the value propositions associated to it. 
Thus, they must collectively build the means to learn about what has to be learnt.  
Discussion on Bricolage 
Our findings show that selection may occur at any moment of bricolage, so to say during 
the crafting, the testing, and the evaluating steps. This is quite surprising as previous literature 




During the crafting, selection may occur as the result of a tacit compromise between the 
bricoleurs. When the bricoleurs share the same understanding of the situation, early 
convergence may be a strategic way to ensure good collaboration among the participants to 
the platform. This is the case in GETS 1, when the bricoleurs decide to converge on the 
grandfathering allocation mode to secure collaboration from the rest of the electricity sector. 
During the crafting episode, selection may also occur as mechanisms of natural selection: it 
happens that the combination that is proposed is not feasible technically or needs important 
engineering. In such cases the bricoleurs may decide to abandon an alternative, even if the 
associated value proposition may be important. This is what happened during the second 
crafting episode when the steering committee rejected the green bond proposition for 
technical reasons.  
During the testing, the selection mechanism that we observe is "natural selection". It may 
happen that the product of bricolage doesn't resist to real conditions. The gateway episode 
during GETS 2 is a good example of natural selection. As the system designed by the 
consulting agency bugged, it was not possible to project further expectations on this 
arrangement. 
 During the evaluation step, selection takes the form of a compromise. The selection 
mechanism is a negotiation between the bricoleurs. During the testing, the bricoleurs have 
formed preferences toward the different possible arrangements or toward specific design 
features, that they are ready to defend during the evaluation. When the preference structure of 
the bricoleurs is similar, then convergence is possible. This was the case during the two 





We studied two episodes of institutional bricolage on the European carbon market inside a 
platform to understand how innovative arrangements are selected during processes of 
institutional innovation. We contribute to the three following literatures: institutional theory, 
the performativity of economics and bricolage in organizations. First, in the context of 
institutional theory, we show the role of platforms in selecting institutional arrangements. We 
highlight three selection mechanisms of institutional arrangements: tacit compromise, natural 
selection and negotiation. Tacit compromise, natural selection and negotiation mechanisms 
involve a growing degree of agency. Second, we contribute to the literature on the 
performativity of economics by describing empirically the activities undertaken on such 
platforms: crafting, testing and evaluating. Eventually, we expand the understanding of 
organizational bricolage by suggesting that selection may occur any time during the reflexive 
dialogue.    
Furthermore, our paper suggests that "experimental moments" play an important role 
during processes of institutional bricolage. Indeed, institutionalization processes not only 
consist in promoting aggressively an innovation that have been previously identified and 
theorised, such as in the model of the institutional entrepreneur (Battilana et al., 2009). It 
consists in exploring new options, new possible orders for collective action. Our paper shows 
how different possible orders are collectively imagined and experienced in platforms. It seems 
that collective learning is crucial to inform processes of institutional innovation. Traditionally, 
collective inquiry, the form of learning it conveys, is a dimension of institutional processes 
that is not explored. It is different from theorization (Greenwood et al., 2002; Strang and 
Meyer, 1993) as theorization may happen only as an ex-post rationalization of innovation (to 
highlight its strengths compared to previous situation). It seems that experimentation, that is 
inherent to bricolage may play an important role during processes of institutional innovation 
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as originator of agency. Our findings suggest that experimentation stimulates the degree of 
agency involved in selection mechanisms. The role of experimentation as an originator of 
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Figure 1. Comparative overview of the different logics represented in the Eu-ETS 
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Figure3. Chronology of the GETS platform 
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